1 Introduction
==============

The Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) ([@btw177-B2]) hosts controlled-access raw and processed human genomic data and associated phenotypic data. While datasets are stripped of metadata linking them with specific individuals, the remaining data is still sensitive in part because it could be combined with external information to identify individuals. The NIH requires adherence to security guidelines for the proper handling of dbGaP-protected data, from acquisition through destruction (see <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/pdf/dbgap_2b_security_procedures.pdf>). These include physical security of computing infrastructure, restricting inbound internet access, multi-factor authentication (MFA) and password policies, encryption of data, enforcing the principle of least privilege and logging data access. For many investigators, the guidelines pose a practical challenge: institutional computer clusters may not be compliant, requiring IT policy revisions or intervention by IT administrators.

The recent NIH announcement (<https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-15-086.html>) allowing investigators to request permission to transfer to and analyse dbGaP data in compliant clouds provides a convenient alternative: investigators can use protocols and software tailored for secure analysis of dbGaP data in a commercial cloud, bypassing local infrastructure issues.

Commercial cloud providers allow users to rent computational and storage resources residing in large data centers. Reputable providers like Amazon, Microsoft and Google ensure physical security of data centers. Resources come in standardized units of hardware and software; the hardware is rented in standard (usually virtualized) units called instances and software comes pre-installed on standard disk images selected at launch time.

Amazon Web Services (AWS) is a popular choice for genomics data analysis. Key datasets such as 1000 Genomes, TCGA and ICGC are hosted in AWS storage, allowing researchers to use cloud-enabled tools without copying data across the internet (see <https://aws.amazon.com/1000genomes/> and <https://aws.amazon.com/public-data-sets/tcga/>). Input data, intermediate results and final results can all be kept in cloud storage before final results are downloaded or browsed. AWS also provides guidance on secure analysis of protected genomic data (see <https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/compliance/AWS_dBGaP_Genomics_on_AWS_Best_Practices.pdf>).

We describe two important first steps toward enabling typical investigators to analyse dbGaP-protected data on AWS: (i) Rail-dbGaP, a protocol for analyzing dbGaP data in the cloud using Elastic MapReduce (EMR), an AWS service; and (ii) the v0.2 line of our Rail-RNA tool ([@btw177-B3]), which implements the protocol to securely download and align many dbGaP-protected RNA sequencing (RNA-seq) samples at once on EMR. We demonstrate the tool by running it on 9,662 RNA-seq samples from the GTEx project.

2 Protocol features
===================

An EMR Hadoop (<http://hadoop.apache.org>) cluster consists of a master instance and several worker instances. The Rail-dbGaP security architecture ([Fig. 1](#btw177-F1){ref-type="fig"}) secures the cluster to satisfy dbGaP guidelines. These guidelines are described below in the context of AWS and are formulated more precisely in the [supplementary document](http://bioinformatics.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/btw177/-/DC1) entitled, 'The Rail-dbGaP protocol,' also available at <https://github.com/nellore/rail-dbgap/blob/master/README.md>. The [supplementary document](http://bioinformatics.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/btw177/-/DC1) further walks the reader through the development of an EMR pipeline that uses the Rail-dbGaP protocol to analyse three dbGaP-protected test samples. Fig. 1.The Rail-dbGaP security architecture. Security features include a Virtual Private Cloud with a private connection between the computer cluster and cloud storage, audit logs recorded on cloud storage, encryption of sensitive data at rest and in transit, and restricted inbound access to the cluster via security groups

-   *Cluster is within a subnet of a Virtual Private Cloud (VPC).* A VPC is a logically isolated unit of the cloud providing a private network and firewall. The connection with the cloud storage service (Amazon Simple Storage Service, or S3) is via a 'VPC endpoint,' which ensures that data transferred never leaves the data center.

-   *Inbound traffic is restricted via security groups.* A security group is essentially a stateful firewall. A master security group for the master instance and a worker security group for worker instances prevent initiation of any connection to the cluster except by essential web services.

-   *Data are encrypted at rest.* During cluster setup, before any sensitive data has reached the cluster, each instance runs a preliminary script ('bootstrap action') that uses Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) (<https://guardianproject.info/code/luks/>) to create an encrypted partition with a keyfile. The key is randomly generated on each instance and never exposed to the user. Temporary files, the Hadoop distributed file system and buffered output to the cloud storage service are all configured to reside on the encrypted partition via symbolic links. Files written to cloud storage are also encrypted. On S3, this is enforced by creating a bucket policy (i.e. rules governing user access to the bucket) barring uploads that do not use server-side encryption.

-   *Data are encrypted in transit.* Worker instances download dbGaP data using SRA Tools (<http://ncbi.github.io/sra-tools/>), ensuring encryption of data transferred from dbGaP to the cluster. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is enabled for transfers between cloud storage and the cluster as well as between cloud storage service and compliant local storage to which an investigator saves results.

-   *Identities are managed to enforce the principle of least privilege.* The principle of least privilege prescribes users have only the privileges required to perform necessary tasks. In the Rail-dbGaP protocol, an administrator uses multi-factor authentication, grants the user only necessary privileges and constrains the user to set up a password satisfying NIH security best practices at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/pdf/dbgap_2b_security_procedures.pdf>.

-   *Audit logs are enabled.* These record logins and actions taken by the user and on the user's behalf, including API calls made by processes running on the cluster. On AWS, audit logs take the form of CloudTrail logs stored in encrypted S3 buckets.

3 Application
=============

The Rail-dbGaP protocol is implemented in the v0.2 line of Rail-RNA. Detailed instructions on implementation are available at <https://github.com/nellore/rail-dbgap>, and Rail-RNA v0.2.x may be downloaded at <http://rail.bio>. We used the Rail-dbGaP protocol to align 9662 paired-end RNA-seq samples obtained by the GTEx consortium ([@btw177-B1]) in 30 batches across various human tissues over a period of 5 days, 5 h and 28 min for US\$0.32 per sample. Computational details, mapped read proportions and a cost calculation are described in the [Supplementary Material](http://bioinformatics.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1093/bioinformatics/btw177/-/DC1). Scripts for reproducing our results are available at <https://github.com/nellore/runs/tree/master/gtex>.

Supplementary Material
======================
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